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THE MISTAKES IN LOCKE V. DA VEY AND THE
FUTURE OF STATE PAYMENTS FOR SERVICES
PROVIDED BY RELIGIOUS INSTITUTIONS
Thomas C. Berg* and Douglas Laycock**
In the last twenty years, the ground has shifted dramatically in the federal
constitutional disputes over the provision of government funds to religious schools
and social services. Once the question was which few funding programs would be
permitted to include religious schools under the Burger Court's demanding
Establishment Clause rules.' But the Rehnquist Court changed direction and
permitted the inclusion of religious institutions in more and more funding
programs. Under the new approach, the pressing constitutional question became
whether the Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses permit government to exclude
religious institutions from programs that fund private secular institutions
providing the same services. The new question arose because many states are
likely to exclude religious schools because of political opposition or because of
state constitutional restrictions on providing funds to "sectarian" institutions or
2
instruction.
In Locke v. Davey,3 the Supreme Court confronted the new question:
whether singling out religious education for exclusion from generally available
education benefits violates the Free Exercise Clause by discriminating against
religious choice. The Court rejected the free exercise challenge by a strong 7-2
vote, on a set of facts seemingly sympathetic to the challenger. The State of
Washington provides high-achieving students of modest family incomes with

* Professor of Law, University of St. Thomas School of Law (Minnesota). Portions of this article
are adapted from an amicus brief that the authors wrote in Locke v. Davey on behalf of the Council for
Christian Colleges and Universities et al. (available at 2003 WL 22176102 and http://www.clsnet.org/clrf
Pages/amicus/locke-davey.pdf).
** Alice McKean Young Regents Chair in Law, University of Texas School of Law.
1. See e.g. Aguilar v. Felton, 473 U.S. 402 (1985); Sch. Dist. of City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473
U.S. 373 (1985); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
2. See e.g. Becket Fund, States, http://www.blaineamendments.org/states/states.html (accessed Jan.
24, 2005) ("Thirty-seven states have provisions in their constitutions that explicitly bar government aid
to so-called 'sectarian' schools or institutions."); Toby J. Heytens, Student Author, School Choice and
State Constitutions, 86 Va. L. Rev. 117, 123, 123 n. 32 (2000) (listing "[a]pproximately thirty state
constitutions [that] contain [stricter] provisions commonly known as Blaine Amendments"); Frank R.
Kemerer, State Constitutions and School Vouchers, 120 Educ. L. Rep. 1, 20 (1997) (listing seventeen
states with "unfavorable" state constitutional law for vouchers, and a number of others where the
result is uncertain).
3. 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
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scholarships usable at any of the dozens of colleges in the state, for any of scores
of majors, but denies scholarships to those few students who choose to major in
theology taught from a devotional perspective. 4 By upholding the Washington
exclusion, the Court may have signaled that states will have broad discretion in all
their funding programs to discriminate against religious educational choices. The
free exercise claim for equal funding may have been strangled in its infancy.
In our view, it would be unfortunate if Davey ended the entire debate. We
think that the majority opinion does not go nearly so far, and that even its
narrower holding rests on a series of mistakes, large and small, about the nature
and purposes of the Religion Clauses. Most importantly, the Washington
exclusion violates the Clauses' central goal by permitting government to distort
the individual choice of scholarship recipients about whether to major in a
religious subject. After detailing this and other problems with the opinion, we
turn to the issues that remain after Davey, especially the prime issue of vouchers
to fund education from kindergarten through 12th grade ("K-12"). Parts of Davey
suggest that states now have carte blanche to exclude religious choices from K-12
vouchers and other funding programs. But much of the opinion focuses on the
special case of funding the training of clergy, and we sketch the argument for
limiting Davey to its reasoning, thus forbidding states from singling out religious
providers for exclusion from other funding programs.
I.

THE COURT'S OPINION

The State of Washington provides scholarships to high achieving students of
modest income at any accredited college or university in the state, majoring in any
subject, except for those majoring in theology from a religious perspective. Joshua
Davey was eligible for a state Promise Scholarship to attend college on the basis of
his academic record and his family's modest income. He was declared ineligible,
however, because he decided to major in theology, along with business
administration, at Northwest College, an evangelical Protestant school. The
disqualifying feature of his theology major was that it would be taught from a
standpoint that was "devotional in nature or designed to induce religious faith." 5
If the theology major at Northwest College had reflected a "secular" or "purely
academic" approach to religion and the Bible, Davey would have kept his
scholarship. 6
Davey challenged his exclusion from the scholarship on two constitutional
grounds. The first was that it violated the Free Exercise Clause, by singling out a
4. Id. at 716.
5. Id. (quoting Petr. Br. at 6, Davey, 540 U.S. 712).
6. Petr. Br. at 5, 10, Davey, 540 U.S. 712; see id. at 10 (arguing that devotional courses "teach the
Bible as truth, whereas a purely academic understanding"-for which a student could receive a
scholarship-"would not necessarily subscribe to the Bible as ultimate truth"). Likewise, students in
University of Washington theology courses could receive scholarships and take a secular approach to
St. Augustine, Kierkegaard, and other thinkers on "God, man, knowledge, and authority." Jt. App. at
68, 72, Davey, 540 U.S. 712. But a religion major at Northwest College would lose a scholarship
because he studied the very same thinkers from the standpoint of whether and how they support
Christian faith.
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religious choice for denial of a government benefit, under decisions such as
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah7 and McDaniel v. Paty.5

The second was that it violated the Free Speech Clause, under decisions such as
Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of University of Virginia,9 by discriminating

against theology programs taught from a religious viewpoint. ° The Ninth Circuit
ruled for Davey on both theories. 1 But the Supreme Court reversed that decision
in an opinion written, somewhat surprisingly, by Chief Justice Rehnquist.
In rejecting Davey's free exercise claim, the majority made two sets of
arguments.12 The first was that denial of funding is not a constitutionally
significant burden on religion, or is at most a minimal one. The Court rejected the
argument that singling out religion for exclusion from funding was "presumptively
unconstitutional" under decisions like Lukumi. 13 That case involved criminal
prohibition and an attempt "to suppress ritualistic animal sacrifices of the Santeria
religion.' 4 But the burden on religion from discrimination in funding was "of a
far milder kind," because withholding funding "imposes neither criminal nor civil
sanctions on any type of religious service or rite,"' 5 "does not deny to ministers the
right to participate in the political affairs of the community,",16 and "does not
require students to choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a
government benefit."'

The majority's second set of arguments was much narrower. The Court cast
the case as one about the training of clergy, and it concluded that the state had
distinctively strong interests in denying funding for such activity.' 8 The majority
7. 508 U.S. 520 (1993).
8. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
9. 515 U.S. 819 (1995).
10. See also Good News Club v. Milford C. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001); Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches
Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
11. Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002), rev'd, 540 U.S. 712 (2004).
12. On Davey's free speech claim, the Court did not question that excluding students majoring in
theology "from a devotional perspective" was viewpoint discrimination under Rosenberger, 515 U.S.
819. Rather, it limited Rosenberger's rule against viewpoint discrimination in funding to governmentcreated forums for speech. It concluded that "[tihe purpose of the Promise Scholarship Program is to
assist students from low- and middle-income families with the cost of postsecondary education, not to
,encourage a diversity of views from private speakers."' Davey, 540 U.S. at 720 n. 3 (quoting U.S. v.
American Library Assn., 539 U.S. 194, 206 (2003) (plurality)). This holding seems likely to dispose of
most free speech challenges to excluding religious education, because other education funding
programs seem even less likely than college funding to qualify as speech forums. We discuss elements
of the free speech holding only as they bear on the Court's Religion Clause analysis. For further
analysis of the free speech holding, see Douglas Laycock, Theology Scholarships, the Pledge of
Allegiance, and Religious Liberty: Avoiding the Extremes but Missing the Liberty, 118 Harv. L. Rev.
155, 191-95 (2004).
13. Davey, 540 U.S. at 720.
14. Id.
15. Id. In the light of this language, it seems apparent that Davey does not change the Lukumi rule
that discriminatory regulation of religion is presumptively unconstitutional. We discuss here only
Davey's impact on cases involving government benefits. For discussion of Davey and regulation cases,
see Laycock, supra n. 12, at 200-18.
16. Davey, 540 U.S. at 720.
17. Id. at 720-21.
18. The actual excluded category, devotional theology majors, is not the same as prospective clergy.
Some students in the major will pursue other careers, and some students in other majors will end up as
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said that there were "few areas in which a State's antiestablishment interests come
more into play"' 9 than funding of clergy training, and it offered several reasons
why. First, training to join the clergy was unlike "training for secular professions":
"[t]raining someone to lead a congregation is an essentially religious endeavor"
and is "akin to a religious calling as well as an academic pursuit., 20 The
Constitution has "distinct views" about religious activity "that find no counterpart
with respect to other callings or professions."2 1 "That a State would deal
differently with religious education for the ministry than with education for other
callings is a product of these views, not evidence of hostility toward religion., 22 In
addition, "[s]ince the founding of our country, there have been popular uprisings
church leaders, which was one of the
against procuring taxpayer funds to support
23
religion.,
'established'
an
of
hallmarks
This second set of arguments is limited to the funding of clergy and does not
necessarily validate the denial of funding for other religious choices or activities.
Indeed, the majority noted that Washington allowed recipients to use Promise
Scholarships for religious instruction-to attend pervasively religious colleges like
Northwest, and to take devotional theology classes as long as that was not their
major. 24 The majority went so far as to say, in response to Justice Scalia's warning
that the decision would authorize states to exclude religion from all public
services, that "the only interest26 at issue here is the State's interest in not funding
the religious training of clergy.,
II.

DAVEY'S MISTAKES

The Davey decision rests on a series of mistakes about the nature and
purpose of the Religion Clauses. Some of these mistakes concern the basic
standard that should apply to free exercise claims challenging the exclusion of
religion from funding programs. Others concern the state interests that might
justify the exclusion of devotional-theology majors from generally available state
college scholarships.

clergy members. Some students will change their minds. Joshua Davey had "planned for many
years... for a lifetime of ministry, specifically as a church pastor," Davey, 540 U.S. at 717 (quoting Jt.
App. at 40), and that may yet happen, but he is currently a student at Harvard Law School. See Tony
Mauro, Harvard Law Student on Top of the Docket: Former Divinity Student Presses Church-State
Case, 26 Leg. Times 1 (Dec. 1, 2003). The Court never justified its step of equating devotional
theology majors with future clergy. Devotional theology majors may be the best available proxy for
prospective clergy, because asking students directly whether they plan to become clergy is both
intrusive and likely to produce some inaccurate answers and predictions. But the fact that the question
would be intrusive is an indicator of the inappropriateness of singling out clergy students for exclusion
from the program.
19. Davey, 540 U.S. at 722.
20. Id. at 721.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 722.
24. Davey, 540 U.S. at 724-25.
25. Id. at 729-30 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting).
26. Id. at 722 n. 5 (majority) (emphasis added).
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Confusion about Neutrality: Formal NondiscriminationVersus Substantive
Religious Choice

A.

Davey argued that the state's exclusion of theology majors is "presumptively
unconstitutional because it is not facially neutral with respect to religion., 27 The
argument, as Davey and the Court phrased it, sounded in nondiscrimination:
Davey relied on the "fundamental" and "minimum" requirement of the Free
Exercise Clause that a law may not single out religiously motivated activity for
unfavorable treatment.28 In the words of Lukumi, "[a] law that targets religious
conduct for distinctive treatment" must "undergo the most rigorous of scrutiny"
and "will survive strict scrutiny only in rare cases., 29 This principle forbids laws
that "impose special disabilities on the basis of... religious status., 30 The "unique
disability" imposed in McDaniel v. Paty was denying to members of the clergy a
generally available opportunity-the right to serve in the state legislature if
elected by the voters.3' In Davey, the "unique disability" imposed on devotional
theology majors was to deny them a generally available financial benefit solely
because they chose a particular religious course of study.
The discrimination was unquestionable: as in Lukumi, the singling out of
religious activity "f[e]ll well below the minimum standard, 32 for a law to be
neutral and generally applicable. Nor should it have helped that the state allowed
scholarship recipients to make certain other religiously motivated choices, such as
attending a religious school or taking religious courses, as long as they did not
major in devotional theology. The state in McDaniel, by disqualifying clergy from
sitting in the legislature, "impose[d] a unique disability '33 on those who held their
religious views "with such depth of sincerity as to impel [them] to join the
ministry., 34 Similarly, by denying a scholarship to those who care enough about
their religious beliefs to concentrate on devotional theology, Washington
"impos[ed] ...a civil disability upon those deemed to be too deeply involved in
religion. ,3
The Court rejected the argument that this facially discriminatory treatment
of religion violated the Free Exercise Clause. One of its key premises was that the
First Amendment treats religion differently from other activities:
[T]he subject of religion is one in which both the United States and state
constitutions embody distinct views-in favor of free exercise, but opposed to
establishment-that find no counterpart with respect to other callings or
professions. That a State would deal differently with religious education for the

27. Id. at 720.
28. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 523, 532.
29. Id. at 546; see also Empl. Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S.872, 877-78, 888 (1990).

30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Smith, 494 U.S. at 877 (citing McDaniel, 435 U.S. 618).
435 U.S. at 632 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring).
508 U.S. at 543.
435 U.S. at 632 (Brennan & Marshall, JJ., concurring).
Id. at 631.
Id. at 639-40.
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ministry than with education for other
callings is a product of these views, not
36
evidence of hostility toward religion.

We wholeheartedly agree that the Constitution often requires distinctive
treatment of religion. But in cases such as Davey, the proper principle is
nondiscrimination against religion. Both nondiscrimination in Davey's case and
distinctive treatment in other situations ultimately serve a more fundamental goal:
that government should avoid interfering with the voluntary choices of private
individuals in religious matters.
The ultimate goal of the Constitution's provisions on religion is religious
liberty for all-for believer and nonbeliever, for Christian and Jew, for Protestant
and Catholic, for Western traditions and Eastern, for large faiths and small, for
atheist and agnostic, for secular humanist and the religiously indifferent, for every
individual human being in the vast mosaic that makes up the American people.
The ultimate goal is that every American should be free to hold his own views on
religious questions, and to live the life that those views direct, with a minimum of
government interference or influence.
The fundamental principle to achieve that goal is for the government to
maintain "substantive neutrality" toward religion. Substantive neutrality means
that:
[T]he religion clauses require government to minimize the extent to which it either
encourages or discourages religious belief or disbelief, practice or nonpractice,
observance or nonobservance.... [R]eligion [should] be left as wholly to private
choice as anything can be. It should proceed as unaffected by government as
possible....
This elaboration highlights the connections among religious neutrality, religious
autonomy, and religious voluntarism. Government must be neutral so that religious
belief and practice can be free. The auto nomy of religious belief and disbelief is
maximized when government encouragement and discouragement is minimized.
The same is true of religious practice and refusal to practice. The goal of maximum
religious liberty can help identify
the baseline from which to measure
37
encouragement and discouragement.

Substantive neutrality is not always the same as formal neutrality, where "formal
neutrality" means facial nondiscrimination or the absence of religious
classifications.38 Sometimes the government may or even must treat religion
differently from other ideas and activities in order to preserve the goal of
minimum government interference in religious choices and commitments. For
example, the government may accommodate private, voluntary religious exercise
by exempting it from burdensome regulation, even if the exemption does not

36. Davey, 540 U.S. at 721.
37. Douglas Laycock, Formal, Substantive, and Disaggregated Neutrality Toward Religion, 39
DePaul L. Rev. 993, 1001-02 (1990) (footnotes omitted).
38. See e.g. Lukumi, 508 U.S. at 561-62 (Souter, J., concurring).
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"come[] packaged with benefits to secular entities., 39 Even though such an
exemption gives religion distinctive treatment, it is constitutionally legitimate if it
"does not have the effect of 'inducing' religious belief, but40 instead merely
'accommodates' or implements an independent religious choice.,
When the government itself speaks, it must also treat religion distinctively.
Neutrality usually requires that the government not express religious views itself
or take a position on religious questions, even though it may express views on a
host of nonreligious questions and even seek to lead public opinion concerning
them. 4 ' But restrictions on the government's own religious speech do not
authorize government to discriminate against the voluntary religious speech or
activity of private individuals. "[T]here is a crucial difference between government
speech endorsing religion, which the Establishment Clause forbids, and private
speech endorsing religion, which the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses
protect. '42 As the Court emphasized in Rosenberger, a holding that the state "may
not discriminate based on the viewpoint of private persons whose speech it
facilitates" does not govern issues 43concerning "the [state's] own speech, which is
controlled by different principles.,
As everyone concedes, the instruction at private colleges where
Washington's scholarships could be used was private speech and private activity,
not government speech. The scholarships could be applied to a broad variety of
educational choices, including any accredited college and any major except
theology from a religious viewpoint. These wide ranging courses taught by
varying faculty are bound to include conflicting perspectives, and thus-like the
long list of student publications funded in Rosenberger-they cannot logically be
called the position of the state. 44 The private nature of this speech and activity is
also evident from the student's right to use the scholarship for religious instruction
as long as it occurs in a major other than theology. If using the scholarship really
made the courses government speech, Davey could not apply the scholarship to
any religious courses at all.
It is entirely consistent to hold that government must treat religion
distinctively in some contexts, such as government's own speech, but must give it
equal treatment in others, such as the provision of benefits. The explanation lies
again in the underlying principle of substantive neutrality, that government should
minimize its effect on citizens' diverse religious choices. In the context of
government speech, neutrality means that government is constrained to express

39. Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 483

U.S. 327, 338 (1987).
40. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 727 (1981) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting on other grounds).
41. See e.g. Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 591 (1992) (unlike in secular matters, "[iln religious
debate or expression the government is not a prime participant"); Sch. Dist. of Abington Township v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222-26 (1963) (holding that neutrality forbids public schools to conduct Bible
readings or other religious exercises).
42. Bd.of Educ. of Westside Community Schs. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990) (plurality).

43. 515 U.S. at 834.
44. See id. at 833.
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neutral viewpoints or to say nothing at all. Neutral expression on controversial
subjects is hard to maintain; it is usually easier to preserve neutrality by silence,
because "[any [express] statement the government makes is bound to favor one
faith over another; even an ecumenical statement that seeks to 45be inclusive of all
faiths favors ecumenical religion over the more sectarian kinds.,
By contrast, "government can respect religious pluralism when it gives
financial aid, by giving aid to any group (religious as well as non-religious) that
provides the requisite services., 46 Thus, the way for the state to keep out of
private individuals' choices about religion is to refrain from religious statements in
its own speech and to allow individuals receiving educational benefits to use those
benefits at private religious schools on the same terms as private secular schools.
Denying Davey's scholarship plainly interfered with his individual choice in
religious matters. The Court has repeatedly recognized that providing aid to
private individuals under neutral, secular criteria and allowing them to use that aid
at either religious or nonreligious schools promotes the "genuine and independent
choices of [those] individuals., 47 Conversely, to withdraw aid because a student
chooses a religious major interferes with the student's choices. The Court said48
that the effect is "mild" when discrimination takes the form of denying a benefit,
but there is no basis for that assertion. By declaring a major in pastoral ministries,
Davey lost nearly $2,700 in scholarship aid for two years of college. Common
sense, precedent, and the record all suggest that the prospect of losing such an
amount would often affect a student's choice of major, *especially for Promise
Scholarship recipients with their modest family incomes.49 In Sherbert v. Verner5 0
the Court found "unmistakable," and unconstitutional, "pressure ...to forego [a
religious] practice" in the prospect of losing 22 weeks of modest unemployment
benefits. 51 And in Davey itself, Northwest College's financial aid officer testified
that students consider "changing [their] major to get" or retain the state
scholarships.52
45. Thomas C. Berg, Religion ClauseAnti-Theories, 72 Notre Dame L. Rev. 693, 745 (1997).
46. Id.
47. Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,536 U.S. 639, 649 (2002). See also Zobrest v. CatalinaFoothills Sch.
Dist., 509 U.S. 1 (1993); Witters v. Wash. Dept. of Servs. for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481, 487-88 (1986);
Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388 (1983).
48. Davey, 540 U.S. at 720.
49. See Wash. Admin. Code § 250-80-020(12)(e) (1999) (providing that recipient's family income
cannot be more than thirty-five percent above the state median).
50. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
51. Id. at 404; see id. at 417-18 (Stewart, J., concurring).
52. The officer elaborated:
Being a Christian school, and working with the State, this issue, as you can imagine, comes
up. And with the student who is perhaps struggling with being eligible for State money and
their major, I talk with them....
[I say that] [i]f you are planning to become a minister, no matter what your major is, this
warrant, this check, this award, is not intended to go to a student in your position. And I talk
with the student, by just changing your major to get this award is not the correct thing to do.
Jt. App. at 156-57, Davey, 540 U.S. 712. The counselor seemed to emphasize the spirit rather than the
letter of the law, for a student taking a non-theology degree can retain his scholarship even if he is
preparing for the ministry. Wash. Admin. Code § 250-80-020(12). But the key point is this: the
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By excluding theology studies taught from a "devotional" perspective, the
state created an incentive for students not to pursue that major and instead to
pursue a major less infused with religious teaching. To paraphrase Sherbert, "the
pressure upon [students] to forego [a theology major] is unmistakable. 5 3 In
addition, because Washington allows scholarships for those pursuing a religion
major taught from a secular perspective, it might induce some students committed
to a religion major to choose a college whose approach to the study of religion is
more secular and less devotional. At the margin, it might induce some colleges to
tip their religion courses from the devotional toward the secular in order that their
religion majors may receive Promise Scholarships.
These distortions of private choice should have been held to violate the First
Amendment. State interference with private religious choice is minimized when
the state funds nothing, or when it funds everything within a neutrally defined
category. Discriminatory funding is always the worst policy, because it pressures
54
citizens to adapt their own religious choices to the state's favored categories.
The principle of substantive neutrality also shows why the religion-based
exclusion differs from other conditions on funding that the Court has allowedprimarily the conditions against funding abortions. The abortion funding
decisions reason that the state may "make a value judgment favoring childbirth
over abortion, and . . . implement that judgment by the allocation of public

funds. 5 5 The state may "ma[ke] childbirth a more attractive option [than
abortion], thereby influencing the woman's decision., 56 It may do those things as
long as it does not put an "undue burden" on the abortion decision, or an obstacle
"that was not already there" 57 because of the woman's indigence.
In this respect, religious freedom is quite different from abortion rights. The
state must be neutral on religious questions; it may not express preferences about
religion of the sort it expresses about abortion and childbirth. The abortion
funding cases distinguished religion cases on precisely this ground.58 Substituting
religious references in the Court's statements about abortion would make those
statements plainly untrue as a matter of law. The state has no power "to make a
value judgment favoring [nonreligion] over [religion], and to implement that
judgment by the allocation of public funds." 59 It has no authority to "make
counselor's testimony confirmed that students consider which choice of major will cause them to lose
their Promise Scholarship.
53. 374 U.S. at 404.
54. For further elaboration on this point, see Michael W. McConnell, The Problem of Singling Out
Religion, 50 DePaul L. Rev. 1, 39-40 (2000); Laycock, supra n. 12, at 195-200.
55. Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 192-93 (1991) (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977));
see also Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 872-73 (1992) (joint opinion) ("'[T]he Constitution
does not forbid a State or city, pursuant to democratic processes, from expressing a preference for
normal childbirth."') (quoting Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 511 (1989)).
56. Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.
57. Webster, 492 U.S. at 508; Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.
58. See Maher, 432 U.S. at 474-75 n. 8 (distinguishing Sherbert, 374 U.S. 398, on the ground that
Sherbert "was decided in the significantly different context of a constitutionally imposed 'governmental
obligation of neutrality"').
59. Cf Maher, 432 U.S. at 474.
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[secular private schools] a more attractive alternative, thereby influencing the
[student's] decision." 6 It has no power, "pursuant to democratic processes, [to]
expres[s] a preference for [nonreligion over religion].",6' The aim of religious
freedom is to keep the government out of people's religious choices, not to let it
influence or manipulate
religious choices up to a point just short of imposing
"undue burdens. '' 62
B.

UnconstitutionalPenalty on Religious Choice

Even assuming that the state can favor nonreligious over religious choices by
funding nonreligious courses and excluding religious ones, the denial of
scholarships to students like Davey still should have been held unconstitutional.
By excluding Davey from a scholarship, the state did not merely decline to fund
religious instruction as the Court claimed. 63 The state went further and imposed
an independent penalty on Davey's religious choice, by denying him aid for
secular courses-aid to which he would otherwise be entitled-because he chose
to pursue a theology major taught from a religious perspective. The state
subjected Davey to an unconstitutional condition.
The Court's case law distinguishes unconstitutional conditions from mere
refusals to fund. "Our 'unconstitutional conditions' cases involve situations in
which the Government has placed a condition on the recipient of the subsidy
rather than on a particular program or service, thus effectively prohibiting the
recipient from engaging in the protected conduct outside the scope of the federally
funded program." 6 Put differently, the cases distinguish between government
"merely refus[ing] to pay" for an activity, and government "deny[ing] . . . any
65

independent benefit" because the beneficiary engages in the activity.
A key factor in this distinction is whether the recipient can, in realistic terms,
pursue his constitutionally protected activities in a separate program. The Court
in FCC v. League of Women Voters of California66 struck down a federal law
barring federally funded radio and TV stations from editorializing. Because the
law provided no effective way for the station to "segregate its activities according
to the source of its funding," it effectively meant that a "station that receives only

60. Cf. id.
61. Cf Casey, 505 U.S. at 872.
62. A similar point distinguishes American Library Assn., 539 U.S. at 210-13, which upheld the
condition that libraries receiving federal funds for Internet services take steps to filter out
pornographic material. Governments do not endorse every publication in their libraries, but neither
do libiaries attempt to neutrally collect everything that is printed. They necessarily choose "material
of requisite and appropriate quality for educational and informational purposes." Id. at 211. Implicit
in this judgment is another point: government need not be neutral toward pornography. Government
cannot suppress pornography in private hands, but "libraries have traditionally excluded pornographic
material from their other collections," id. at 212, and certainly public schools could teach children that
pornography is best avoided. In contrast, schools plainly could not teach children that religion is best
avoided.
63. Davey, 540 U.S. at 721.

64. Rust, 500 U.S. at 197 (emphasis in original).
65. Regan v. Taxn. with Representationof Wash., 461 U.S. 540,545 (1983).
66. 468 U.S. 364 (1984).
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1% of its overall income from [federal] grants is barred absolutely from all
editorializing. 67 But in Regan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington,68
which upheld the condition that tax-exempt organizations not engage in lobbying,
it was crucial that the exempt organization could create a separate § 501(c)(4)
entity for lobbying and still maintain deductibility for contributions to its §
501(c)(3)

entity. 69 The Court

specifically noted

that the

requirements for

separating the two entities were "not unduly burdensome" and there was no
showing that the plaintiff "was unable to operate with the dual structure., 70 Rust
v. Sullivan71 was explicitly decided by analogy to Regan and in sharp contrast to
72
League of Women Voters. The Court underestimated or minimized the difficulty
of physically separating contraception and abortion services,73 but the Court's
claim that family-planning agencies could realistically engage in abortion
counseling and referral in separate programs outside the federally funded project
was essential to the opinion as written.74
The Court made a similar claim in Davey, but this time it greatly exceeded
the bounds of plausibility. Withdrawing Davey's scholarship went beyond
"refus[ing] to pay for" religion; it "den[ied an] independent benefit '7 5 by
withdrawing aid for his entire education. Davey took numerous courses for which
he would have received scholarship support had he not declared theology as a
major. All Northwest College theology majors took core courses in subjects such
as English and math.76 But the penalty for choosing a theology major was
particularly clear in Davey's case. He proposed to double major in business
administration and theology. He lost funding for his business administration
degree solely because he also chose to major in theology at Northwest. The
Washington exclusion is so broad-covering the entire "school where the
scholarship is used" 7 7 -that Davey could not pursue a secular degree at Northwest

College even in an entirely separate program from his theology degree, with no
overlap in faculty, classroom space, or other features.
The Court answered that the scholarship exclusion did not "require students
to choose between their religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit,"
assertedly because "Promise Scholars may still use their scholarship to pursue a

67. Id. at 400.
68. 461 U.S. 540 (1983).
69. Id. at 544-46.
70. Id. at 544-45 n. 6. Likewise, in American Library Assn., 539 U.S. 194, the Court emphasized
"the ease with which patrons may have the filtering software disabled," id. at 209, which limited the
effect of the funding condition on other, constitutionally protected speech viewed by adults. See also
id. at 214-15 (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 219-20 (Breyer, J., concurring).
71. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
72. See id. at 197-98.
73. See N.Y. v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 1261, 1271 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (reviewing evidence of financial
burdens and interference with medical care), affd on other grounds, N.Y v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401 (2d
Cir. 1989), affd, Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
74. See Rust, 500 U.S. at 198.
75. Regan, 461 U.S. at 545.
76. Jt. App. at 148-49, Davey, 540 U.S. 712.
77. Petr. Br. at 25, Davey, 540 U.S. 712.
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secular degree at a different institution from where they are studying devotional
theology. 7 8 As the state put it, Davey could use the Promise Scholarship for the
non-theology major at Northwest, and then "simultaneously us[e] his own money
to pursue a theology degree in a separate program at a second school."'7 9
This answer is no solution whatsoever. The Court implicitly suggests that
the student pay close to two full-time tuitions simultaneously 80 and bear the
serious inconvenience of attending two full-time programs at potentially distant
campuses. The state alternatively suggested that a student pursue each degree
half-time~l-and therefore, of course, take twice as long to finish college. Either
course is so "unduly burdensome ' 82 that the condition "effectively prohibit[s] the
recipient from engaging in [a theology degree] outside the scope of the [state]
funded program."83 Discrimination that forces a student to attend a different
college or university is a constitutionally cognizable burden, as the Court held in
Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan.84 Hogan said that a female-only
admissions policy at state nursing school "[w]ithout question ...worked to [the
male applicant's] disadvantage" by forcing him to drive "a considerable distance
from his home" to a coeducational state nursing school and to forego jobs that he
could have had closer to home.85
The burden in these cases does not stop at inconvenience. To devout
students preparing for the ministry, theology degrees are not fungible items.
There is no guarantee-indeed, it may be less than likely-that a student like
Davey will find another theology program that he can realistically attend and that
fits his doctrinal beliefs and his particular goals for his ministry career. If the
student instead chooses Northwest College for theology, he may not find a
Washington college that he can attend that teaches business courses in an
evangelical Christian context as Northwest does. Either way, the rigid terms of
Washington's school-wide exclusion cause students like Davey not only a severe
practical burden, but also a serious risk that their conscientious choice of religious
education will be frustrated.
It was absurd for the Court to say that Davey would not be significantly
burdened by undertaking, and paying for, two college educations instead of one.
The Court came to this result because of a separate principle-that government
can require physical separation of funded and unfunded activities. 86 The Court

78. Davey, 540 U.S. at 721 n. 4.
79. Petr. Br. at 25, Davey, 540 U.S. 712.
80. The Promise Scholarship's yearly maximum of approximately $1,500 covers only a small
percentage of tuition at most colleges, especially private ones. Paying two tuitions with a $1,500
scholarship is far more expensive than paying one tuition without a $1,500 scholarship; the state's
proposed method of offering financial support for Davey's secular education would actually cost
Davey thousands of dollars.
81. See Petr. Br. at 12, Davey, 540 U.S. 712.
82. Regan, 461 U.S. at 545 n. 6.
83. Rust, 500 U.S. at 197.
84. 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
85. Id. at 724 n. 8.
86. For further elaboration on this paragraph, see Laycock, supra n. 12, at 178-83.
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has allowed governments to carry this principle to extreme lengths. If government
is willing to pay for most college educations but not for theology majors, it can
require rigorous separation of the two to avoid any indirect subsidy to theology
majors. Taken to its logical conclusion, this approach authorizes government to
ban any activity it chooses on any premises where government funds are spent, to
ensure that the government funds do not inadvertently subsidize the banned
activity. This rule of physical separation threatens to completely swallow the rule
against unconstitutional conditions. It was another of Davey's mistakes to defer
so totally to Washington's demands for physical separation of funded and
unfunded activities, without weighing the actual burden these demands imposed
on Joshua Davey.
C.

Denying Scholarships Served None of the Purposes of the Religion Clauses

Refraining from state funding of private religious education can, in some
situations, serve the Religion Clauses' goals of liberty and religious autonomy.
Government money is a powerful source of government influence; government
expenditures on religion generally expand government influence in a field where
that influence should be minimized. Describing the same point from the private
perspective, voluntary funding of religious instruction often maximizes individual
liberty and the influence of private choice. Each individual can decide when, how,
and how much to contribute to whom, and whether to contribute at all. Voluntary
funding of religious organizations protects individual conscience and keeps
government out of religion.
But Washington's exclusion of theology majors like Davey served none of
these goals. Indeed, it transgressed a number of them. Government funding
decisions have the least impact on private religious choice when government funds
nothing, or when it funds everything within a neutrally defined category.
Government does maximum harm to free choice when it funds some choices and
refuses to fund their directly competing alternatives. The Court claimed that
Davey was a strong case for refusing state aid. In reality, the case was very weak.
1.

Imposition on Taxpayers' Consciences

A common and longstanding argument against state support of private
religious organizations is that it forces taxpayers to support instruction in religious
doctrines that they may conscientiously oppose. The objection goes back as far as
Thomas Jefferson's charge "that to compel a man to furnish contributions of
money for the propagation of opinions which he disbelieves is sinful and
tyrannical., 87 The majority cited this history in noting that protests against
taxpayer funding of church leaders go back to "the founding of our country.""

87. A Bill for EstablishingReligious Freedom (1786), reprinted in Michael W. McConnell, John H.
Garvey & Thomas C. Berg, Religion and the Constitution 70 (Aspen 2002).
88. Davey, 540 U.S. at 722.
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We discuss the overall relevance of that history in detail below. 89 For now, we
focus on the concern about respecting the taxpayer's choice not to fund religion.
This may be a consideration in some cases, but not in Davey.
The state plainly did not think that including students' religious choices in
Promise Scholarships coerced any taxpayers to support religious instruction. The
state awarded scholarships to students at religious colleges such as Northwest
majoring in any subject other than theology. It did so even though non-theology
majors likely would receive a great deal of religious instruction at Northwest,
which (like many other religious colleges)
aims to educate all students "from a
9
'distinctly Christian' point of view."
Promise Scholarships should not be seen as coercing taxpayers to support
religion. On facts highly similar to those in Davey, the Court held 9-0 in Witters v.
Washington Department of Services for the Blind9 ' that when a college student

chooses to use neutrally available aid for a pastoral course of study at a
pervasively religious college, "the decision to support religious education is made
by the individual, not by the State." 92 The same factors that made the connection
between the state and the religious instruction "highly attenuated" in Witters93
were present with respect to Promise Scholarships. Nothing in the scholarship
program gave recipients like Davey any financial incentive to choose a religious
course of study, and indeed a relatively small percentage made that choice. 94 In
other words, the state simply required the taxpayer to support a student's
education-which benefits the state in secular terms by "assuring the
development of the talents of its qualified domiciliaries." 95 It is the student's
decision, not the state's, for the education to be religious.
The Court, of course, focused on the fact that support for devotional
theology majors was (in most cases) support for training of clergy. But the
element of clergy training makes no change in the logic of the situation. Larry
Witters was also training for the ministry, but the Court unanimously rejected a
challenge to state funding of his education. If the choice of how to use the funds is
the student's, not the state's, then the choice to pursue training for the ministry is
the student's as well.
2.

Government Entanglement in Religious Questions

Some forms of funding require the government to make discretionary
decisions about which activities are valuable enough to fund, how much funding
they should receive, and so forth. When decisions involving religious recipients
turn on discretionary rather than bright-line factors, there is a danger that

89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

See infra pt. II(C)(4).
Davey, 299 F.3d at 751.
474 U.S. 481 (1986).
Id. at 488.
Id.
See id.
Davey, 299 F.3d at 756.
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government will interfere in and distort private religious choices by deciding
whom to fund, or in what amount, according to political pressure, popularity, or
the religious preferences of the dominant faction. In its early no-aid decisions of
the 1970s, the Court warned about competing political pressures for discretionary
grants direct to religious schools. % But respecting the choice of students like
Davey to use their scholarships for theology study does not involve the state in
any religious questions. The state simply offers the scholarship to students who
qualify because of academic achievement and family income, without regard to
whether the student chooses a religious use and without making any subjective
judgment. The case law now firmly distinguishes such "true private choice" 9
programs from programs that directly involve the government in religiously
sensitive decisions.
It is the exclusion of students like Davey that puts the state in the improper
position of drawing discretionary and religiously significant lines. The state must
decide, for example, which theology degrees are taught from a secular,
"academic

perspective and which are taught in ways "designed to induce

religious faith." Some programs may fall clearly in one category or the other: the
University of Washington's theology classes may be clearly secular,' ° while
Northwest College classes may be clearly devotional. But the line is far less clear
at other colleges, which try to maintain an often "precarious balance," in Stephen
Carter's words-giving weight to both the teachings of their church and the
standards of the secular academy.
Consider, for example, this policy statement of Brigham Young University:
At BYU, individual academic freedom is based not only on a belief (shared by
all universities) in the value of free inquiry, but also on the gospel principle that
humans are moral agents who should seek knowledge in the sacred as well as in the
secular, by the heart and spirit as well1 2as by the mind, and in continuing revelation
as well as in the written word of God.0

It is far from clear how the state should apply its secular/devotional distinction if
Brigham Young were located in Washington. To decide whether BYU theology
degrees were eligible, the state might have to examine their content closely. It
might have to conduct the kind of "comprehensive, discriminating, and continuing
state surveillance"' 0 3 that the Court has said creates excessive entanglement
between church and state. By approving the devotional/secular distinction, Davey
96. See e.g. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 622-23.
97. See e.g. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 649; Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 810-11 (2000) (plurality); id. at
841-44 (O'Connor & Breyer, JJ., concurring); Witters, 474 U.S. at 487-88; Mueller, 463 U.S. at 397-99.
98. Petr. Br. at 10, Davey, 540 U.S. 712.
99. Id. at 6.
100. See supra n. 6 and accompanying text.
101. See Stephen L. Carter, The Constitution and the Religious University, 47 DePaul L. Rev. 479,
485-86 (1998).
102. Brigham Young University, Statement on Academic Freedom at BYU, http://www.byu.edu/fc/
pages/refmapages/acadfree.html (accessed Jan. 24, 2005) (reprinted in Douglas Laycock, The Rights of
Religious Academic Communities, 20 J.C. & U.L. 15, 36 (1993)).
103. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 619.
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invites other states to make such religiously sensitive and entangling decisions in
their funding criteria.
3.

Recipient Schools' Autonomy

Even if the state offers a funding program with no religious conditions on
eligibility, the funding might still raise religion clause concerns if it comes with
other conditions limiting the autonomy of participating religious schools. Just as
religious conditions distort the religious choices of those eligible for scholarships,
such conditional funding might create incentives for a religious school to
compromise its independent mission and message and conform to the state's views
and policy goals. But such concerns are absent or minimal with a program like
Washington's Promise Scholarships. There was no assertion that any conditions
accompanying Promise Scholarship eligibility might realistically restrict a religious
Again, scholarships were available to students at any
school's autonomy.
accredited undergraduate institution in the state, and for any program of study
save one. The only significant condition was the very one at issue here-the
exclusion of theology majors taught from a religious perspective. Ending that
exclusion would have ended the one incentive that schools have to change their
teaching so that their students can receive state aid.
4.

The Founding-Era History

We can review the weakness of the state's interests in Davey by comparing
modern education funding like Promise Scholarships with the funding of religion
that the Founders rejected and the Davey majority cites. As the Court noted,
"[p]erhaps the most famous example of public backlash' ' 04 against funding of
clergy was Virginia's rejection of the general assessment in 1785.1°' The Court
relied on the rejection of the general assessment as a reason to resist
nondiscriminatory funding of scholarships for higher education. But the two
programs are fundamentally different. Nothing like the general assessment has
been seriously proposed since repeal of the Massachusetts establishment in 1833.
As is made clear by its full title-A Bill Establishing a Provision for
Teachers of the Christian Religion-the essence of the general assessment was a
massive discrimination in favor of religious viewpoints. In a time of minimal
government, Christian clergy and Christian places of worship were to be singled
out for special subsidy. Supporters of the measure did all they could to make it
nonpreferential as among Christian denominations. They even provided a secular
alternative for non-Christians and conscientious objectors, who could decline to
designate a church and thereby send their clergy tax to a fund for schools.'0 But
there was no attempt to make the general assessment neutral as between religion

104. Davey, 540 U.S.at 722 n.6.
105. See A Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion, reprinted in Everson
v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 72-74 (1947) (Supp. App. to the opinion of Rutledge, J., dissenting)
[hereinafter General Assessment Bill].
106. Id. at 74.
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and nonreligion. No one claimed, or could have claimed, that clergy and church
buildings fell within the neutrally drawn boundaries of some larger category of
state-funded activities. And no one claimed, or could have claimed, that the state
would receive any secular service or benefit not derived from the religious
functions of the churches. The argument for the general assessment was the
familiar argument for other forms of establishment-that the state would benefit
from having a more Christian population. The premise was that "the general
diffusion of Christian knowledge hath a natural tendency to correct the morals of
which cannot be
men, restrain their vices, and preserve the peace of society;
10 7
effected without a competent provision for learned teachers.,
All modern funding cases, including Davey, are fundamentally different
from the general assessment. No one proposes to fund the inherently religious
functions of churches. No one proposes the funding on the ground that religion
alone provides a unique or greater social benefit than do secular ideas; and no one
proposes to fund religious organizations preferentially over secular organizations
providing the same service. Instead, the state funds a service-in this case, higher
education-that is offered by both secular and religious providers. Higher
education at religious colleges like Northwest College met all the state's
accreditation requirements and offered a wide range of courses less infused with
religion than those in the theology department.
The broad neutral category of higher education includes, as one of its many
applications, the training of clergy, and the training of clergy is a core religious
function. But for multiple reasons, Davey is still like the modem funding cases
and unlike the general assessment. The training of clergy is clearly an incidental
application of a vastly broader program; the training of clergy also serves the
state's goal of educating its citizenry; and the decision to direct the money to
religious uses is made by private citizens with no encouragement from the state.
Discriminatory exclusion of theology majors powerfully interferes with private
religious choice, but treating them identically with all other majors does not
influence anyone's choice. Excluding theology majors from a generally applicable
program is a far greater departure from religious neutrality than including them.
As Justice Scalia's dissent put it:
One can concede the Framers' hostility to funding the clergy specifically, but that
says nothing about whether the clergy had to be excluded from benefits the State
made available to all. No one would seriously contend, for example, that the
Framers
would have barred ministers from using public roads on their way to
1 8
church. 0
Nor would the Framers have "excluded ministers from generally available
disability or unemployment benefits."'' 9 The majority responded that the text of
founding-era provisions was not expressly limited to preferential funding of the

107. Id. at 72.
108. Davey, 540 U.S. at 727-28 (Scalia & Thomas, JJ., dissenting) (emphasis in original).
109. Id. at 728 n. 1.
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clergy.11 ° But preferential funding was the only issue in the founding-era; the
Founders had no intention either way about funding a broad category of secular
activities that included some religious applications. Their ratified texts did not
address such possibilities, which were almost literally unimaginable under the
limited governments of the time.
Before Davey, the Court had already decided cases where a neutrally

defined category included some applications involving core religious functions.
Witters was such a case; the Court held that a broad scholarship program could be
And Rosenberger was such a case; the
applied to the training of clergy.11'

magazine at issue there was core religious speech, permeated with evangelical, and
evangelistic, Christian faith. 112 The secular benefit to the state was not in the
magazine's religious speech as such, but in the creation of a broad and
nondiscriminatory forum for ideas. Promise Scholarships presented one more in a
series of modern funding cases, in which the state pays for a secular benefit and a
religious institution provides that benefit in conjunction with religious functions of
its own."'

110. Id. at 723 (majority).
111. Witters, 474 U.S. at 489.
112. See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 825-26; id. at 865-67 (Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ.,
dissenting).
113. Some of the state's amici in Davey tried to erase the difference between modem
nondiscriminatory funding of secular functions performed in religious contexts and the general
assessment's discriminatory funding of religious functions. They claimed that Madison and Jefferson
opposed "an effort by the Virginia Assembly to impose an assessment for the support of houses of
worship and teachers of religion, including teachers in private religious schools." Br. of Amicus Curiae
Historians & L. Scholars at 6, Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (emphasis added). They claimed that "Jefferson
and Madison viewed their constitutionally based [no-aid] principle as applying in the religious school
context." Id. at 7. Justice Souter made a similar argument in his dissent in Rosenberger, claiming that
the assessment was "more general in scope" than funding Christian clergy because "scholars have
generally agreed that the bill would have provided funding for nonreligious schools." Rosenberger, 515
U.S. at 869 n. 1 (Souter, J., dissenting). For these propositions, both Justice Souter and the Davey
amici cited Douglas Laycock, Thomas Buckley, and Thomas Curry-none of whom supports the
argument.
Each of the cited sources simply describes the assessment bill's opt-out paragraph, which
provided that the payments of any taxpayer who failed to designate a church should be paid "into the
public Treasury, to be disposed of under the direction of the General Assembly, for the
encouragement of seminaries of learning." General Assessment Bill, in Everson, 330 U.S. at 74;
Thomas E. Buckley, Church and State in Revolutionary Virginia, 1776-1787, at 108-09, 133 (U. Va.
Press 1977); Thomas J. Curry, The First Freedoms: Church and State in America to the Passage of the
First Amendment 141 (Oxford U. Press 1986); Douglas Laycock, "Nonpreferential"Aid to Religion: A
False Claim About OriginalIntent, 27 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 875, 897, 897 n. 108 (1986). Laycock shows
that the reference to "seminaries of learning" meant schools for general education, not schools for the
training of ministers. Id. Buckley and Curry treat that usage as obvious. The whole issue was
theoretical; there was no general school fund in Virginia before 1810. J.L. Blair Buck, The
Development of Public Schools in Virginia 1607-1952, at 28-29 (Commw. Va. 1952). There were
probably few Virginians in 1785 willing to publicly advertise themselves as non-Christians. But public
advertisement was the price of exemption; the bill required public posting of an alphabetical list of
taxpayers and the churches they had designated to receive their tax. General Assessment Bill, in
Everson, 330 U.S. at 73.
What is important is that the provision for payment to a school fund was not an effort to support
religious schools as part of support for education overall. Rather, it was an effort to accommodate the
possibility of non-Christian taxpayers in a program whose overwhelming purpose and effect was to
support core religious teaching. And it was a minor aspect of the bill; it occasioned no controversy and
certainly was not the target of the assessment's opponents. Madison did not mention schools in his
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State Discretionto Choose a Church-State Policy

Given the effect of Washington's exclusion on religious choice and the
weakness of the asserted justifications, the Court's ruling ultimately rests on giving
the states wide discretion in making policy toward religion. The majority led off
by saying that "[t]hese two Clauses, the Establishment Clause and the Free
Exercise Clause, are frequently in tension," but that "'there is room for play in the
joints' between them. In other words, there are some state actions permitted by
the Establishment Clause but not required by the Free Exercise Clause., 114 By
emphasizing the state's discretion, the majority was able to find that the
discrimination against theology majors was permitted even though the unanimous
Court in Witters had found that it was not required by Establishment Clause
values. In our view, the argument for discretion here rests on the final deep
misconception of the Religion Clauses.
It is no accident that the Court's formulation ties the need for "play in the
joints" between the clauses to the idea that they are "in tension." If the Free
Exercise and Establishment Clauses conflict or push in opposite directions, then
indeed the reach of one clause or both needs to be cut down; otherwise, anything
the state did concerning religion in a given situation would run into a
constitutional barrier on one side or the other. But the matter is different if the
two clauses are not conflicting, but complementary-if they constitute two aspects
of a single statement or principle about religion and the government. If both
clauses together serve the goal of protecting individual religious choice, then it
makes perfect sense to say that a policy-like Washington's-that distorts
religious choice is both unsupported by the Establishment Clause and violative of
the Free Exercise Clause. In the words of Justice Scalia's dissent, "There is
nothing anomalous about constitutional commands that abut."11 5 Indeed, if the
two clauses work together, one would expect that a policy that serves no
Establishment Clause values would also conflict with Free Exercise Clause values.
The Religion Clauses should be read as complementary aspects of a single
principle. To interpret them as conflicting is, as one of us has previously argued,

Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Establishments (reprinted in Everson, 330 U.S. at 6372 (app. to the opinion of Rutledge, J., dissenting), the most complete compendium of secular and
Buckley's survey of other arguments against the
religious arguments against the assessment.
assessment does not mention any attack on the schools provision. Buckley, supra, at 113-43. It is a
gross distortion of history to convert this exemption for non-Christians into an attempt to raise money
for religious schools with implications for modern funding programs.
114. Davey, 540 U.S. at 718-19 (citation omitted).
115. Id. at 728 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Scalia's example is that "[a] municipality hiring public
contractors may not discriminate against blacks or in favor of them; it cannot discriminate a little bit
each way and then plead 'play in the joints' when haled into court." Id. (emphasis in original). We do
not think that the Equal Protection Clause necessarily reduces solely to formal nondiscrimination, and
we think that the Religion Clauses at bottom protect individual choice rather than simply prohibiting
formal nondiscrimination. But we agree with Scalia's general point: the Constitution may set a
principle (nondiscrimination or individual choice) and forbid the state to depart from it in either
direction.
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"a mistake at the most fundamental level., 116 It "imputes incoherence to the
Founders," and it ignores the historical record: "The Religion Clauses were no
but the unified demand of the most vigorous
compromise of conflicting interests,
117
advocates of religious liberty."
Certainly the state needs some discretion to choose among different policies
that affect religion. There should be discretion when the state's interest in acting
is strong-as the "compelling interest" test in free exercise law tries to ascertainand perhaps when the constitutional principles at stake in a case are ambiguous or
conflicting, so that either course of action may affect religious freedom.
But in Davey, as we have argued, there was little argument that
constitutional principles were in tension, or that the denial of funds would serve
certain religion clause principles. The exclusion of students like Davey violates
the core principles of religious choice and serves none of the salutary purposes
that rules against discretionary state funding of religious education might serve.
As the Court held in Widmar, to withhold a widely available benefit from an
activity simply because of the religious viewpoint it reflects cannot be justified by
the interest "in achieving greater separation of church and State than is already
Indeed, funding students in
ensured under the Establishment Clause."' 8
circumstances like Davey's is not merely permitted by the Establishment Clause; it
is so clearly permitted that the question is not even close. The Witters decision,
permitting such funding on similar facts, was unanimous, including the votes of
those justices who were the most restrictive of funding under the Establishment
Clause-Justices Brennan, Stevens, and Marshall (the latter of whom wrote the
Court's opinion).119
Because the arguments against funding in Davey's situation were so weak, to
hold that the state could not discriminate against his religious choice would have
been far from holding that the state must fund religion whenever the
Establishment Clause permits it. Most obviously, a state need not fund private
education at all. But if it does choose to fund private education, it must have
compelling justifications for discriminating against religion.
III.

DAVEY, VOUCHERS, AND OTHER AID CASES

Before the Court's decision, observers generally saw the Davey case as
simply the first Supreme Court skirmish in the war over whether funding
programs may include religious institutions such as schools and social services.
The main battle is not over college scholarships for religious majors, but over the
inclusion of church-affiliated K-12 schools in programs of vouchers given to
families to use at the school of their choice. Including religious schools in voucher
programs is permissible under Zelman, but many states and cities might exclude

116. Douglas Laycock, Continuity and Change in the Threat to Religious Liberty: The Reformation
Era and the Late Twentieth Century, 80 Minn. L. Rev. 1047, 1088 (1996).
117. Id.
118. Widmar, 454 U.S. at 276.
119. See 474 U.S. at 482-93.
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religious schools for political and policy reasons or because of state constitutional
provisions that bar aid to "sectarian" or religious institutions or instruction. 2 °
Some observers have now suggested that the 7-2 rejection of Davey's claim
ends the war at the first skirmish: that it eliminates any free exercise or free speech2

1
challenges to the exclusion of religious schools from K-12 voucher programs.1

Several courts have agreed. Florida's intermediate appeals court, for example,
treated Davey as controlling on whether the state constitution validly excluded
religious 22
schools from a scholarship program for students in failing public school
1
districts.
Davey can be read to allow states to exclude religious schools from K-12
voucher programs. But it can easily be read much more narrowly, and in view of
our criticisms of the decision, we think the narrow reading is much to be preferred.
The key question is which of the two bases for Davey set out in part I is most
fundamental. The first basis-that the denial of funding is not a constitutionally

significant burden on religion' 3-broadly

applies to the funding of K-12

education and likely dooms any free exercise challenge to the exclusion of
religious schools from vouchers. If withholding a $2,700 two-year college
scholarship is only a "mil[d]" burden on religion because "[i]t imposes neither
criminal nor civil sanctions,' 24 then neither is it a real burden to withhold a K-12
voucher, typically worth only a little more per year. 25 If the Court was willing to
say that the Washington exclusion "d[id] not require students to choose between
their religious beliefs and receiving a government benefit, 1 26 then it also seems

120. For overviews of the state no-aid provisions and the issues they raise, see Thomas C. Berg,
Vouchers and Religious Schools: The New ConstitutionalQuestions, 72 U. Cin. L. Rev. 151, 164-68, 199208 (2003); Heytens, supra n. 2; Kemerer, supra n. 2; Joseph P. Viteritti, Blaine's Wake: School Choice,
the First Amendment, and State Constitutional Law, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 657, 681-99 (1998);
Linda S. Wendtland, Student Author, Beyond the Establishment Clause: Enforcing the Separation of
Church and State Through State ConstitutionalProvisions,71 Va. L. Rev. 625, 638-42 (1985).
121. See e.g. Erwin Chemerinsky, Government Is Not Required to Aid Religion, 40 Trial 84, 87 (May
2004) ("IT]he Court's decision can be understood as a ruling that allows government to decide
whether, and how much, it wants to support religion," including through school vouchers.); Ira C. Lupu
& Robert W. Tuttle, Hitting the Wall: Religion Is Still Special Under the Constitution, Says the High
Court, 27 Leg. Times 68, 69 (March 15, 2004) ("[A]fter Locke v. Davey, federal courts will not rely on
the principle of neutrality" to require that religious schools be equally eligible for vouchers.).
122. Bush v. Holmes, 886 So. 2d 340, 362-67 (Fla. 1st Dist. App. 2004), certified for appeal, id. at 367;
see also Eulitt v. Maine, 386 F.3d 344, 352-56 (1st Cir. 2004) (relying on Davey to reject equal
protection challenge to Maine's practice of paying tuition for students attending private or out-ofdistrict secular schools but not religious schools); Gary S. v. Manchester Sch. Dist., 374 F.3d 15, 20-21
(1st Cir. 2004) (citing Davey in rejecting free exercise challenge to Congress's "failure to provide to
disabled children attending private religious schools the identical financial and other benefits it confers
upon those attending public schools"); Am. Jewish Cong. v. Corp. for Natl. & Community Serv., 323 F.
Supp. 2d 44, 64-65 (D.D.C. 2004) (relying on Davey to exclude religious schools from program of
subsidies to teachers at K-12 schools). None of these cases seriously attended to the choice between
the two competing rationales in Davey or to the Court's statement that "the only interest at issue here
is the State's interest in not funding the religious training of clergy." Davey, 540 U.S. 722 n. 5
(emphasis added).
123. See supra nn. 12-17 and accompanying text.
124. Davey, 540 U.S. at 720.
125. In Zelman, for example, the largest private-school vouchers were worth $2,250 a year. 536 U.S.
at 646.
126. Davey, 540 U.S. at 720-21.
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likely to hold that the denial of vouchers does not require religious-school families
to make such a choice. If the Court-erroneously-thinks it sufficient that
students could use their Promise Scholarships at an entirely different institution, 127
then it may well think it sufficient that religious families could send their children
to separate religion classes after their daily secular education.
But the second, narrower basis for Davey-that the state has a particular
"historic and substantial" interest in denying funds for clergy training'l2 -does not
apply to K-12 vouchers, by its terms or its reasoning. The Court confined itself to
the narrower basis when it said that "the only interest at issue here is the State's
interest in not funding the religious training of clergy., 129 Recall first that the
Court treated training of clergy as a "distinct category of instruction": it differs
from "training for secular professions" in that it "'resembles worship' and is
"akin to a religious calling as well as an academic pursuit."13 Even if clergy
training is so different as to justify excluding it from a funding program open to all
other majors, this argument plainly does not apply to education in K-12 religious
schools. As the Court has long recognized, those schools pursue not only religious
instruction but also secular education. 31 They train students for the same secular
professions and careers that secular schools do; in the Court's words, they "pla[y]
a significant and valuable role in raising national levels of knowledge, competence,
and experience.' 32 The schools teach the same "common subjects like math,
' and "a
English, social studies, and science, that all accredited schools provide,"133
decent elementary or secondary school education in English, math, and science
provides secular
educational value, even if it takes place in a thoroughly religious
4
setting.,

13

Religious K-12 schools, then, do not provide "a distinct category of
instruction": excluding them excludes instruction that falls within the same
category as secular schools but is done from a religious viewpoint. It is a pure case
of discrimination against an activity solely because of its religious motivation or
viewpoint-the core forms of discrimination impermissible under the Free
Exercise and Free Speech Clauses, respectively. Core discrimination against
religious motivation or viewpoint also strengthens the inference for the antireligious animus that the Court said was absent in Davey. In concluding that
Washington had no such animus, the Court relied heavily on the fact that
scholarship students could take non-theology majors and classes taught from a
pervasively religious perspective. 13 But in a K-12 program, this would be the very
127. Id. at 721 n. 4.
128. See supra nn. 18-26 and accompanying text.
129. Davey, 540 U.S. at 722 n. 5.
130. Id. at 721 (quoting Calvary Bible Presbyterian Church of Seattle v. Bd. of Regents of the U. of
Wash., 436 P.2d 189, 193 (Wash. 1967)).
131. Bd. of Educ. of C. Sch. Dist. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245 (1968).
132. Id. at 247.
133. Berg, supra n. 120, at 173.
134. Id. at 174.
135. See Davey, 540 U.S. at 724-25 (noting that Northwest College students received scholarships
even though "its 'concept of education is distinctly Christian in the evangelical sense' and it "prepares
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option that excluding religious schools would forbid. The Court in Davey thought
it important that "the entirety of the Promise Scholarship Program goes a long
way toward including religion in its benefits, 13 6 which cannot be said when
religious K-12 schools are excluded from voucher programs.

In addition, the history of opposition to funding clergy that Davey cites is not
relevant to the inclusion of religious K-12 schools in vouchers and other general

programs of education funding. We have already discussed why even college
scholarships for ministry students, when included in a general program funding
many majors, are quite different from the preferential funding of ministers that
the Founders opposed and Davey cites. 137 But whether to fund K-12 religious

schools as part of general educational funding was simply not an138issue at the time
of the founding, because general education funding did not exist.

Opposition to funding K-12 religious schools dates not to the founding era,
but to the mid-nineteenth century and the Protestant campaign to expand public
schools and deny support to the newly forming Catholic school systems. The

opposition to supporting Catholic schools contained a significant strain of antiCatholic bigotry, as numerous studies have shown. 3 9 The opponents pushed for
Protestant-style prayers and Bible readings in the public schools,14° while blocking

funding to "sectarian" (a code word for Catholic) schools on the ground that they
would educate their students in religious "superstitions" and anti-democratic
habits.14' The opponents failed to enact a federal constitutional ban on aid to

sectarian schools through the Blaine Amendment of 1876, but they succeeded in
nearly forty state
inserting similar bans-"little Blaine Amendments"-into
142
constitutions between the mid-1800s and the early 1900s.

all of its students, 'through instruction, through modeling, and through its classes, to use the Bible as
their guide, as the truth,' no matter their chosen profession") (quoting Jt. App. at 168-69, Davey, 540
U.S. 712).
136. Davey, 540 U.S. at 724.
137. Seesupra pt. II(C)(4).
138. As we have already argued, the inclusion of religious schools in an opt-out provision in the 1785
Virginia assessment bill did not come close to turning that assessment into a general program of
educational funding. See supra n. 113.
139. See e.g. Br. of Amicus Curiae Becket Fund for Relig. Liberty at 6-15, Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S.
793 [hereinafter Becket Br.]; Mark Edward DeForrest, An Overview and Evaluation of State Blaine
Amendments: Origins, Scope, and First Amendment Concerns, 26 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Policy 551 (2003);
Richard W. Garnett, Brown's Promise, Blaine's Legacy, 17 Const. Commentary 651, 670-74 (2000)
(reviewing Joseph P. Viteritti, Choosing Equality: School Choice, the Constitution, and Civil Society
(Brookings Inst. Press 1999)); Charles Leslie Glenn, Jr., The Myth of the Common School 196-206, 22635, 250-56 (U. Mass. Press 1988); Philip Hamburger, Separation of Church and State 209-27 (Harv. U.
Press 2002); Heytens, supra n. 2, at 134-40; John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A PoliticalHistory of
the Establishment Clause, 100 Mich. L. Rev. 279, 297-303 (2001); Lloyd P. Jorgenson, The State and the
Non-Public School, 1825-1925, at 69-221 (U. Mo. Press 1987); Laycock, supra n. 12, at 187-89; Douglas
Laycock, The Underlying Unity of Separation and Neutrality, 46 Emory L.J. 43, 50-52 (1997); Viteritti,
supra n. 120, at 665-75.
140. See e.g. Jeffries & Ryan, supran. 139, at 298-300; Jorgenson, supra n. 139, at 78-83.
141. See e.g. Glenn, supra n. 139, at 229 (quoting Horace Bushnell on "foreign prejudices and
superstitions" taught in Catholic schools); Jeffries and Ryan, supra n. 139, at 301 (noting "'sectarian'
schools... in practical terms meant Catholic"); id. at 302-03 (summarizing nineteenth-century
arguments that Catholicism was "inimical to democracy").
142. See supra n. 2.
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The elements of religious prejudice behind the nineteenth-century state bans
on funding have generated arguments that those provisions are unconstitutionally
tainted and cannot be applied today under the Free Exercise and Equal Protection
Clauses.1 43 In Davey, the Court sidestepped this argument on the ground that the
Washington constitutional provision at issue-which barred state funds from
being "appropriated for or applied to religious worship, exercise or
instruction44-was not based on or associated with the Blaine Amendment. 45
This dubious holding will also dispose of some claims that the denial of K-12
vouchers to religious schools is tainted by historical animus, because states with
school-choice programs can make similar arguments that their exclusion of
religious schools is not based on their Blaine amendment.146
However, Davey clearly does not foreclose challenges to other state
constitutional provisions more directly tied to state or federal Blaine amendments.
The Court noted that another, broader Washington provision-requiring that
schools "supported wholly or in part by the public funds shall be forever free from
sectarian control or influence",14 7-was a descendant of the federal Blaine
Amendment but was not at issue in the case. When a state exclusion of religion
rests on such a provision, it is still open to challenge on the ground that it reflects
anti-Catholic animus.
Much of Davey's reasoning, therefore, rests on the narrow basis that states
have a particular interest in denying funds to clergy training. The Court's
arguments on this score suggest that denying vouchers to K-12 religious schools is
far more objectionable; those arguments certainly do not foreclose such a claim.
Under this reading, Davey is indeed no more than the first skirmish in the war
over state bans on funding, and we think that the Court ought to adopt the narrow
reading. Davey is deeply flawed, for the reasons we set forth in part II, and a
flawed decision ought to be confined as much as possible. More fundamentally,
the facts of the case presented the clergy-training question; that rationale was
sufficient to decide the case and any broader rationale is dictum.
The narrow reading, however, may well be a bad predictor of what the Court
will actually do. Recall that Davey's first basis, that denial of funding is only a
minimal burden, applies just as strongly to the denial of vouchers to religious
schools. For vouchers to be distinguished from college-level clergy training, three
justices in the seven-vote Davey majority must conclude that the two situations are

143. See e.g. Becket Br., supra n. 139; DeForrest, supra n. 139, at 606-24; Garnett, supra n. 139, at
666-74; Heytens, supra n. 2, at 140-59.
144. Wash. Const. art. I, § 11.
145. Davey, 540 U.S. at 723 n. 7.
146. Indeed, the exclusion of religious options from other K-12 school choice programs has rested on
state provisions even further removed from the nineteenth-century anti-Catholic movement, such as
Vermont's 1777 provision forbidding "compell[ed] ...support [folr any place of worship." Vt. Const.
ch. I, art. 3; see also Chittenden Town Sch. Dist. v. Dept. of Educ., 738 A.2d 539, 552-59 (Vt. 1999)
(applying this provision to forbid students in remote areas receiving state high-school tuition benefits
from using them at religious schools, at least without safeguards to confine the application of state
funds to the secular curriculum).
147. Davey, 540 U.S. at 723 n. 7 (discussing Wash. Const. art. IX, § 4).
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different. It is difficult to identify those three votes. Four justices-Stevens,
Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer-oppose the inclusion of religious schools in aid
programs in most circumstances and therefore, a fortiori, will nearly always defer
to a state's exclusion of them. Under the Court's current composition, if any one
among the trio of Rehnquist, O'Connor, and Kennedy continues to vote with the
state, a challenge to the denial of religious-school vouchers will fail.
Moreover, although the denial of K-12 vouchers is more blatantly
discriminatory than the Davey exclusion, the strict separationist case for denying
K-12 vouchers is in some ways stronger than the case in Davey. The claim that
giving scholarships to ministerial students would impose on Washington
taxpayers' conscience was very attenuated given the minute percentage of Promise
Scholarships that went to devotional theology majors. K-12 voucher programs
support education across the secular curriculum, further attenuating the
plausibility of any taxpayer's claim of conscientious objection, but they generally
result in a much larger percentage of overall state funding following families to
religious schools than to college theology majors. In either the college case or the
K-12 case, of course, the funding recipient makes the choice, and the Court has
held-properly, we think-that this fact breaks the causal attribution to the state,
no matter what percentage of aid is used at religious schools. 1 48 But Davey held
that the state could seek to avoid such attribution even when the connection was
attenuated; the majority would likely defer to that state's desire at least as much in
the voucher context. In addition, K-12 vouchers are far more likely than college
scholarships to bring restrictions on the autonomy of the recipient schools (as we
noted, Davey involved no such restrictions). 149 The state generally regulates K-12
schools more closely than it does colleges, and regulations accompanying funding
are correspondingly likely to be more stringent at the lower level. 5 °
If the separationist interests in denying K-12 funding are in some ways
stronger than the weak interests that sufficed in Davey, that suggests that the
exclusion of religious schools from vouchers is likely to be upheld. But there
remains one more argument that exclusion from K-12 vouchers is
unconstitutional, even if exclusion of theology majors is not. As one of us has
argued before, in the context
of
K-12
vouchers "the state may well have a less
• .
.
,151
discriminatory means of achieving" strict separationist goals: it "could decline to
create a private-school voucher program in the first place, meaning no vouchers

148. See Zelman, 536 U.S. at 658-59; Mueller, 463 U.S. at 401.
149. See supra pt. lI(C)(3).
150. For further arguments over the state interests in excluding religious providers from vouchers,
see e.g. Berg, supra n. 120, at 189-97; Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and Religious Liberty: Seven
Questions from Madison's Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 Cornell L. Rev. 783 (2002); Alan E.
Brownstein, Evaluating School Voucher Programs Through a Liberty, Equality, and Free Speech
Matrix, 31 Conn. L. Rev. 871, 889-941 (1999); Steven K. Green, The Illusionary Aspect of "Private
Choice" for ConstitutionalAnalysis, 38 Willamette L. Rev. 549, 558-76 (2002); Ira C. Lupu & Robert
Tuttle, Sites of Redemption: A Wide-Angle Look at Government Vouchers and Sectarian Service
Providers, 18 J.L. & Pol. 539, 549-605 (2002). See generally Mark Tushnet, Vouchers After Zelman,
2002 Sup. Ct. Rev. 1.
151. Berg, supra n. 120, at 197.
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for secular private schools either. In other words, the only kind of educational
'choice' involved in the system would be a choice between various public
schools., 15 2 This broader exclusion would achieve strict separationist goals by
avoiding funding of religious schools, but it would not discriminate against
religious schools within any relevant category. And because the vast majority of
private schools are religiously affiliated, a voucher program limited to secular
private schools does little to achieve the typical goals of such programs-either in
serving a significant number of students or in providing statistically significant
data on what voucher designs work. 5 3 Thus, once religious schools are denied
vouchers, excluding secular private schools as well will do relatively little marginal
harm to the state's policy objectives. Refraining from private-school vouchers
altogether-limiting school choice only to public schools-satisfies both the
political demands of strict separationists and the constitutional principle of not
discriminating against the exercise of religion. The state is not required to forgo
all aid to private schools, but it can do so if it chooses. This nondiscriminatory
alternative negates the asserted justification for discriminating against religious
schools.
The narrow reading of Davey, limiting it to funding of clergy training, also
leaves open challenges to the exclusion of religious options from other state
funding programs. A college scholarship or grant program that excluded religious
schools and religious courses altogether is unlikely, but Davey certainly suggests
that such a restrictive funding ban is open to challenge on the ground that it
reflects animus toward religious education. A more common issue may involve
state programs that fund private social services through vouchers or other
mechanisms of individual choice but then exclude religious providers. Denying
funds simply because a provider is religious or incorporates religious teaching or
exhortation into its program is more objectionable than denying funds for clergy
154
training, for essentially the same reasons we set out concerning K-12 vouchers.
Whether or not the Court will actually see social services and K-12 school
vouchers as different from clergy training is, of course, another matter. Again, the
first half of Davey points more toward discretion for the states to exclude religious
options in many situations. But the arguments for distinguishing vouchers and
social services from clergy training are powerful, with deep roots in the facts of the
case, the opinion of the Court, and the political and constitutional traditions on
which the Court relied. The second half of Davey seems pointedly designed to
leave those arguments open.

152. Id.
153. See e.g. Zelman, 536 U.S. at 656-57 ("Cleveland's [81%] preponderance of religiously affiliated
private schools ... is a phenomenon common to many American cities."); Heytens, supra n. 2, at 121
("Since over 85% of private primary and secondary schools are religiously affiliated, it is difficult to
implement a viable voucher program that does not include religiously affiliated schools." (citing Jeff
Archer, Today, PrivateSchools Span Diverse Range, 16 Educ. Wk. 1, 14 (Oct. 9, 1996)).
154. Compare the federal charitable-choice program, which makes religious providers equally
eligible for funds but states that direct funding to the provider shall not be expended "for sectarian
worship, instruction, or proselytization." 42 U.S.C. § 604a(j) (2000).
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IV.

CONCLUSION

At least two of the mistakes underlying Davey go to the heart of how to
interpret the Religion Clauses. The Davey majority sees free exercise and nonestablishment as conflicting norms and therefore concludes that the scope of each
must be confined in order to save the state from facing incompatible duties. As a
result, clauses designed to limit government influence over individual's religious
choices have been read to give government discretion to pressure those choices.
But if the clauses work together, there is no problem with holding that the
government not only may treat religious educational choices the same as nonreligious choices, but that often it must do so.
In addition, although the Davey majority correctly recognizes that the First
Amendment treats religion differently from other ideas and activities, it fails to
explain what underlying principle governs that distinctive approach. As a result,
the majority can offer no criterion for when to treat religion differently and when
to treat it the same. The principle of leaving religion to individual choice offers
such a criterion. It explains why the government should sometimes treat religion
differently than secular ideas-for example, refraining from interjecting itself into
religious debates by endorsing explicitly religious propositions or messages.
Conversely, though, the distinctive vision of the Religion Clauses means that an
individual's choice to use generally available funding at a religious provider should
be treated just as well as the choice to use it in a nonreligious setting. That is how
the Court should have ruled in Davey, and how it still should-and can-rule in
the case of vouchers for K-12 schools or for social services.
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